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The term constitutionalism is increasingly discussed in the context
of international trade agreements. A prominent example is Professor
Petersmann's writings on the constitutional functions that trade agree-
ments could serve by limiting governmental discretion to take welfare-
reducing protectionist measures against the long-term interests of a
nation and contrary to individual economic liberty.' The absence of
such protectionist constraints and foreign trade rights in domestic con-
stitutions can be mitigated (and already is mitigated somewhat)
through the development of international trade rules and institutions.
One such institution2 frequently analyzed is providing for direct effect
of international trade rules into domestic legal systems or otherwise
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. The author served as
a consultant to the National Governors Association and Western Governors Association during
the development of the U.S. implementing legislation of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round agree-
ments. The views expressed are those of the author alone. The author would like to thank
Professor John H. Jackson, University of Michigan Law School, for his guidance during my
LL.M and S.J.D. research, some of which has been utilized in this article.
1 ERNST-ULucH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FuNCIrONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991).
2 The announcement for the American Society of International Law's International Eco-
nomic Law Interest Group Meeting on Regional Economic Integration explicitly listed direct
effect as an institution. See Joel P. Trachtman, Revolution of International Economic Law, 17 U.
PENN. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 55 (1996) (defining institutions as "any device that constrains future
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establishing private remedies for violation of international trade rules
in domestic courts.3 Indeed, the unavailability of private remedies in
domestic courts of powerful economic nations such as the United
States and Canada is often cited as hindering the constitutional func-
tion that such agreements perform.
Simultaneously, sub-national government behavior is increasingly
under discussion in international trade negotiations.4 This is a direct
result of the increased emphasis in trade negotiations on non-tariff
barriers and the expanded scope of trade agreements into new areas
such as trade-in-services and investment. Agreements on non-tariff
barriers and new areas such as services and investment require con-
straining not only central government behavior but also sub-national
government behavior because of the significant regulatory activity at
the sub-national level in these areas. The negotiation of a Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) is the most recent and visible
example of trade negotiations focusing on non-tariff and new area
topics. The FTAA will likely build upon commitments that nations of
the Americas have recently undertaken within the World Trade Or-
ganization and may use the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) as a model for expanded commitments. Both the Uruguay
Round Agreements, which created the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and the NAFTA place great emphasis on non-tariff and new
area topics.
The behavior of sub-national governments in nations with a fed-
eral system of government that guarantee some sphere of regulatory
autonomy for their sub-national governments causes particular con-
cern to the international and regional trading systems. This concern
is furthered because many of the most powerful economic nations in
the world are federal states. While domestic constitutions in federal
nations often constrain sub-federal governments from enacting tariffs
choice, that constrains some component of politics over some period of time, including rules that
have some binding effect ... ").
3 In the United States, whether an international agreement has direct effect or is "self-exe-
cuting" is an analytically distinct question from whether the agreement can be invoked by a
particular private party. See John H. Jackson, United States, in THE Es'Ecr OF TREAnIEs IN
Dorminsrc LAw (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987); RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF
FOR. REL. LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES, § 111 cmt. g (1987). For purposes of this article, the
assumption is made that if a trade agreement is given direct effect that it will be invocable by
private parties whose trading interests would be affected by a particular government action.
4 See Matt Schaefer, Federalism and Regional Free Trade in the Americas: Searching for
Pareto Gains (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author); Matt Schaefer & Thomas Singer,
Multilateral Trade Agreements and U.S. States-An Analysis of Potential GATT Uruguay Round
Agreements, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 31 (1992).
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and other border barriers to trade, these instruments do not com-
pletely or sufficiently constrain protectionist government behavior in
the form of discriminatory internal regulatory measures. Thus, inter-
national trade agreements, both multilateral and regional, are needed
to perform constitutional functions with respect to sub-federal govern-
ment behavior. This paper focuses on federal states within the Ameri-
cas in light of the importance of the United States and Canada to the
international trading system and the initiative launched in December
1994 to create a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).
The extent to which private remedies in domestic courts for rule
violations are considered essential to this constitutional function likely
depends on the operating conception of constitutionalism. One con-
ception of constitutionalism in the context of trade agreements fo-
cuses on effectiveness. Effectiveness depends on whether
international rules are complied with by governments and whether
compliance with the norms actually has a constraining influence on
protectionist measures and thereby furthers the goals of the rules. In
the case of trade agreements, the goal is to maximize national and
world welfare. Another conception of constitutionalism focuses on
the enforceability of individual rights. These two conceptions are har-
monious in that both ultimately seek or prefer private remedies in
domestic courts. Private remedies in domestic courts are perhaps the
most persuasive means of ensuring compliance by sub-federal govern-
ments with international trade norms. Indeed, private remedies are in
certain respects better suited to perform constitutional functions vis a
vis sub-federal governments as compared to central governments.
However, the two conceptions likely differ in terms of the timing at
which they prefer the creation of such remedies. An effectiveness-
based conception of constitutionalism must balance any compliance
gained by private remedies in domestic courts against the possibility
that premature creation of such remedies will hinder the development
of strengthened substantive obligations with respect to sub-federal
governments. Thus, an effectiveness proponent may recommend a de-
lay in the creation of private remedies while a rights-based advocate
will recommend immediate creation of such remedies.
Part I of this article examines existing domestic constitutional
constraints on sub-federal governments in the United States and con-
trasts these with constraints found in Canada. It concludes that inter-
national trade rules are needed to perform constitutional functions
with respect to sub-federal government actions just as with central
government actions. Part II further explores the notions behind con-
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stitutionalism. It defines the concept of effectiveness and distin-
guishes it from a rights-based concept of constitutionalism. A classic
debate within political science literature is utilized to help compare
these two conceptions of constitutionalism. Part III examines possible
enforcement mechanisms5 for ensuring compliance with international
trade rules. In this context, it explores options for requiring nations to
provide private remedies within their national courts for international
trade rule violations. Part IV analyzes the domestic law effect, includ-
ing the availability of private remedies in U.S. courts, of past and cur-
rent trade agreements from the perspective of U.S. states. The
Canadian approach with respect to private remedies for provincial vi-
olations is analyzed for comparative purposes. Part V examines the
current method of correcting sub-national government violations of
international trade rules and reflects upon the current compliance rec-
ord of sub-federal governments. Part VI proceeds to examine
whether emphasis on private remedies in domestic courts in the short
term might hinder the development of strengthened substantive obli-
gations. Part VII concludes that proponents of an effectiveness-based
conception of constitutionalism, in contrast to a rights-based concep-
tion, will likely recommend delaying the introduction of private reme-
dies in domestic courts until substantive international trade rules
applied to sub-federal governments are strengthened.
I. EXISTING DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON SUB-
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROTECTIONIST MEASURES
FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ARE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
NEEDED TO SERVE A CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION?
Central or federal governments are generally unconstrained by
domestic constitutions when regulating foreign trade.6 Central gov-
ernments are given explicit power to conduct such regulation but are
not required to establish an open market or to pursue trade liberaliza-
tion.7 In other words, central governments have great discretion in
deciding what trade policy to pursue and correspondingly are subject
5 "Enforcement mechanisms" in this article is used in a very broad sense as referring to
mechanisms that seek to enhance compliance with international trade rules. This definition is in
accord with the common understanding of enforcement found in Black's Law Dictionary. How-
ever, this definition encompasses international dispute settlement mechanisms. Enforcement
mechanisms has also been used in the more limited sense of devices (such as trade sanctions)
used to achieve compliance with rulings of the dispute settlement process itself.
6 PEmRsMANN, supra note 1, at 139-209.
7 See, e-g., U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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to a host of protectionist pressures. Public choice theory8 as well as
impressions based on empirical evidence 9 suggest that governments
may pursue protectionist policies despite the fact that such a policy is
injurious to national and world welfare. Thus, it is accepted that inter-
national trade agreements are needed to serve constitutional functions
with respect to federal government behavior. 10
An initial review of the U.S. constitution and other federal consti-
tutions might lead one to be skeptical as to whether international
trade agreements are needed to constrain the discretion of sub-federal
governments. U.S. states are explicitly prohibited under the U.S.
Constitution from imposing tariffs or duties on imports or exports. 1
The Canadian constitution places similar restraints on its provinces.'2
Moreover, one can find similar limitations on sub-federal govern-
ments in many other domestic constitutions establishing a federal sys-
tem of government.' 3 However, border measures such as tariffs are
not the only trade barriers erected that reduce national and world
welfare.
Recognizing that tariff barriers had already been substantially re-
duced, international trade negotiations added an emphasis on non-
tariff barriers as early as the 1970's Tokyo Round multilateral trade
negotiations, the seventh major negotiating round under the auspices
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 4 Non-tariff
barriers subject to negotiation included discriminatory product stan-
dards and government procurement practices. International trade ne-
gotiations subsequently expanded in scope to include trade-in-services
8 See, eg., Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases, 16 INT'L REv. LAW & ECON. 5, 18-21 (1996) ("Public choice theory ... posits that
national and multilateral trade policies alike are the result of interest group politics. National
governments are viewed as politically sophisticated actors... each pursuing self-interested agen-
das such as the maximization of votes, campaign contributions and the like. Well-organized and
well-financed interest groups will influence political outcomes successfully, while poorly organ-
ized or financed interest groups will have little influence.").
9 See, eg., Frieder Roesller, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law (Apr. 18, 1991), in Comparative Analysis of International Dispute Resolution Institu-
tions, 85 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 64, 73 (1991).
10 PETERSMANN, supra note 1, at 210-44.
11 U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
12 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act of 1867) pt. VIIII § 121 ("All Articles of the Growth,
Produce or Manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admit-
ted free into each of the other Provinces"), § 122 (stating that provincial customs laws would
only continue until altered by the Federal Parliament).
13 See, e.g., AusTi.. CONST., § 90 (granting federal parliament exclusive power over customs
and duties); Swrrz. CONST., ch. I, art. 28 (stating that all matters relating to customs are a federal
concern).
14 JoHN H. JACKSON FT AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO RoUND 12-17 (1984).
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during the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations of the late
1980's and early 1990's, recognizing the importance of services to the
international economy.15 Talks are currently underway on a multilat-
eral investment agreement within the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) with hopes to expand any such
agreement to WTO membership.' 6 Similarly, regional free trade
agreements of the United States and Canada have dealt with non-
tariff barrier issues, trade-in-services and investment.' 7 The negotia-
tion of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) will con-
tinue this trend since it involves negotiations on non-tariff barriers,
including government procurement, as well as the new area topics of
trade-in-services and investment.' 8
These non-tariff and new area topics of negotiation are matters in
which sub-federal governments are active regulators. Constraining
sub-federal actors in the United States, Canada, and other economi-
cally powerful federations may be more important to world welfare
than constraining central government action in smaller nations.' 9
Thus, it is important to examine whether domestic constitutional con-
straints on sub-federal government protectionism exist outside the
area of tariffs and other border measures.
15 FEKETEKUTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW AND BLUEPRINT FOR
NEGOTIATIONS (1988); JoHiN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETTON IN SERVICES: A CON-
STITnTONAL FRAMEWORK (1988); Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Na-
tional Study on Trade in Services: A Submission by the U.S. Government to the General
Agreement on Tariffs'and Trade (1984); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, OECD Member Countries' Data on Trade in Services (1987).
16 Gary G. Yerkey, OECD Trade Ministers Agreeto Launch Talks on Multilateral Investment
Pact, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 939 (May 31, 1995).
17 See generally, North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992,32 I.L.M. 289 (1993),
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 713 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA];
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 100-216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988).
18 The initial seven working groups that were established at a ministerial meeting in Denver,
Colorado in July 1995 were the following: 1) market access; 2) customs procedures and rules of
origin; 3) investment; 4) standards and technical barriers to trade; 5) sanitary and phytosanitary
measures; 6) subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties; and 7) smaller economies. See
Ministerial Meeting Adopts Hemispheric Trade Declaration, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1137
(July 5, 1995). Four additional working groups were created at the March 1996 ministerial meet-
ing in Cartagena, Columbia. They are the following: 1) intellectual property rights; 2) competi-
tion policies; 3) services; and 4) government procurement. See FTAA Ministers Agree to
Establish a Dispute Settlement Working Group, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 516 (March 27,
1996). Another working group on dispute settlement will be established at the next ministerial
meeting in 1997. Id. at 510.
19 Schaefer, supra note 4. For instance, California and New York have economies larger
than all but a handful or two of nations in the world. Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism:
U.S. and Canadian Perspectives, 20 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 303, 308 (1994).
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A. United States
In the United States, the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause
provides a constitutional constraint on state regulatory and taxation
authority exercised for protectionist purposes.2" The United States
Constitution explicitly grants the federal government the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce.21 However, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the provision not only as enabling the federal
government, but also as disabling the states. 22 The dormant Com-
merce Clause, so-called because it operates as a constraint on states
even in the absence of action by the federal government, prevents
states from discriminating against or unreasonably burdening inter-
state and foreign commerce. The history of the Commerce Clause
suggests that a central purpose behind the clause was to eliminate the
protectionist battle between the states that occurred under the Arti-
cles of Confederation. 23 However, even greater scrutiny is given to
measures burdening foreign commerce.24 Private parties are allowed
to bring actions against the states based on the dormant Commerce
Clause.
Nevertheless, the constraints provided by the dormant Com-
merce Clause are not comprehensive. At least two, and perhaps
three, major gaps in the constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause
exist. First, the Supreme Court has elaborated a market participant
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.' This exception allows
a state to discriminate against out-of-state or foreign interests when it
acts as a market participant (buyer or seller) rather than a market
20 U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See generally, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NOWAK,
CONSTn ONAL LAv § 11.1 (2d ed. 1992). The Equal Protection Clause provides separate but
related constraints on state protectionist behavior. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,
470 U.S. 869, 881-82 (1985) ("[U]nder the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic
business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose
[under Equal Protection Clause analysis].").
21 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cI. 3.
22 Dormant aspects of the Commerce Clause have been recognized by the Supreme Court
since Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 20. The doctrine appears to have been formally adopted by the Supreme Court in
State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232,21 L.Ed. 146 (1873). See also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
114 S.Ct. 2205, 2228 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
23 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 84 McH. L. Rav. 1091, 1125 (1986).
24 Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446-51 (1979).
25 See, eg., White v. Mass. Council of Constriction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-11
(1983); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,436-40 (1979); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 806-10 (1976).
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regulator.26 Thus, state government procurement practices discrimi-
nating against out-of-state and foreign interests have been held valid
under dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.27 Second, subsidies in the
form of direct payments generally are not subject to dormant Com-
merce Clause scrutiny even though they might be just as distortive of
trade as discriminatory regulation.2s Thus, international trade rules
can play a constitutional function by constraining protectionist behav-
ior by state governments in these two gaps left by the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
A third possible and significant gap involves state practices that
have been discussed in trade negotiations or during the development
of federal legislation which ultimately the federal government chose
not to curb in either an international agreement or federal legislation.
In such instances, the courts have found a strongly inferred toleration
of the state practice and chosen to find that such practices do not in-
terfere with U.S. foreign trade relations.29 Therefore, consideration of
state practices in international trade negotiations without ultimate ac-
tion can potentially weaken domestic constitutional constraints.
26 See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether
the exception applies to the dormant foreign Commerce Clause in which foreign rather than
interstate commerce is implicated. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 n.9. However, most lower courts
have held it should apply in such instances. See, e.g., Carll v. South Carolina Jobs-Economic
Dev. Auth., 327 S.E.2d 331, 448-49 (1985); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 6-21 (2d ed. 1988).
27 See, eg., Trojan Tech. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir., 1990).
28 New Energy Co.' v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (direct subsidization of domestic
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause). But see West Lynn
Creamery, 114 S.Ct. 2205 (invalidating subsidy to in-state milk producers paid directly from tax
on all sales of milk, including out-of-state milk, to retailers). The Court notes that it has never
squarely addressed the question of direct subsidization. Id. at 2214 n.15. The Court did reiterate
its quote from New Energy, however, and it appears the case would have turned out differently
if the subsidy were paid from general revenue funds rather than from the tax on sales of milk to
retailers.
29 See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S.Ct. 2268, 2281-85 (1994) ("Congress may
more passively indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential.' ... Given these indicia of Congress' willingness to toler-
ate States' worldwide combined reporting mandates, even when those mandates are applied to
foreign corporations and domestic corporations with foreign parents, we cannot conclude 'the
foreign policy of the United States-whose nuances ... are much more in the province of the
Executive Branch and Congress than this Court-is [so] seriously threatened."'). See also
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 106 (1986); Container Corp. V.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196-97 (1982); Trojan Tech., 916 F.2d at 912 ("[T]he record in
this case shows that Congress is aware of state activity to restrict procurement of foreign goods
... and yet has not imposed a policy of national uniformity. Thus, state procurement policy fits
comfortably within the Supreme Court's observation that nothing in 'the Foreign Commerce
Clause insists that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice."').
616
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B. Canada
In Canada, the federal government does not have a broad com-
merce power such as in the United States.30 Correspondingly, the Ca-
nadian Constitution has no equivalent to the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine under U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence. Therefore,
significant barriers to internal trade have long existed in Canada.3 '
Some constitutional reform proposals would have granted greater
power to the federal government to act for the benefit of economic
union.32 However, in light of the failure of these constitutional pro-
posals, the federal and provincial governments entered into an agree-
ment on internal trade seeking to liberalize some of the nearly 500
barriers to such trade.33 Recent trade agreements such as the NAFTA
provided some impetus for the internal barriers agreement because
foreign interests may have received better access to provincial mar-
kets than out-of-province Canadian interests in certain respects.34
However, negotiators used extreme caution to ensure that benefits of
the internal trade agreement would not be extended to traders from
foreign nations.35 Thus, international trade agreements can serve an
important constitutional function in Canada by constraining protec-
tionist action by provinces against foreign interests and by pressuring
further elimination of internal barriers to trade.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM: EFFECTIVENESS-BASED VERSUS RIGHTS-
BASED CONCEPTIONS
The term constitutionalism is used in many ways, but central to
the notion of constitutionalism is limited government or government
subject to the rule of law.36 But for what purpose do people seek to
30 PETER W. HOG, CONSTrTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 439 (2d. ed. 1985) (noting that this is
a result of judicial interpretation).
31 Canada's Provincial-Federal Legislation Harms Foreign Trade GATT Report Says, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 46, at 1800 -01 (Nov. 23, 1994) ("Inter-provincial trade barriers
have become a major problem for Canada, hampering economic growth and job creation, as well
as reducing competitiveness of Canadian-based firms.").
32 See ThE CHARLoT'rowN AccoRD, THE REFERENDUM, & THE FUTURE OF CANADA,
(Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick Monahan eds., 1993).
33 Agreement on Internal Trade, entered into force July 1995. The agreement has been sub-
ject to much criticism as being weak, however. See, eg., Jay Bryan, Ottawa Must Finally Act on
Slashing Internal Trade Barriers, MONTREAL GAZETTE, June 18, 1996 at Fl.
34 James Stanford, Trade Barriers Within Canada Divide Us in More Ways than One, THE
FINANCIAL POST, June 22, 1996, at 19.
35 See NAFTA: Canada's Federal-Provincial Pact Not Accessible to Foreign Firms, 11 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1129 (July 20, 1994).
36 WILLIAM GEORGE ANDREWS, CONSTrTUTIONS AND CONsTTuTIONALuSM 13 (3d ed. 1968).
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limit their government? There appears to be at least two discreet
although related conceptions behind the term constitutionalism as
used in international trade circles. The first relates to the general wel-
fare; the second relates to individual rights.
Constitutionalism is often gauged in international trade circles by
the effectiveness of international norms. This effectiveness-based con-
cept is itself subject to some vagaries. For instance, sometimes the
term is used as a substitute for compliance. Specifically, under this
usage, an international norm is effective if it is complied with by gov-
ernments. However, the use of effectiveness in this paper will refer to
something broader. Compliance is better thought of as one element
of effectiveness. 37 An effectiveness-based conception of constitution-
alism needs to focus not only on whether international norms are
complied with by governments but also on whether compliance with
the norms achieves the goals of the norms. In the case of interna-
tional trade rules, the goal is to maximize national and world welfare
gains by constraining governments from enacting protectionist meas-
ures.38  An effectiveness-based conception of constitutionalism is
properly concerned not only with the degree of compliance but also
with the strength or constraining effects of the substantive rules if gov-
ernments do in fact comply. If the substantive rules only purport to
minimally constrain protectionist behavior, then compliance with such
rules will not serve to increase welfare very much.39
The second conception of constitutionalism discussed in interna-
tional trade circles relates to the integration of the international legal
system with domestic legal systems. Specifically, it gauges the degree
of constitutionalism by whether international norms enter the domes-
tic legal system and whether private parties are otherwise granted the
ability to make claims against their government in domestic courts
37 See AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSLETTER 1 (June-Aug. 1996) (recognizing that compliance
and effectiveness are related but analytically distinct). See also Edith Brown Weiss, Remarks at
the Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in 90 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 210,
211-12 (1995) ("Implementation and compliance differ from effectiveness. The agreement may
be complied with but still be ineffective in attaining its stated objectives. Even if the agreement
is sufficient for its stated objectives, it may still not be effective in addressing the targeted
problem.").
38 See Jo-N H. JACKSoN, Trm WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 8-17 (1989); PETERSMANN, supra
note 1, at 12-16.
39 For instance, consider two hypothetical international trade agreements. One limits tariffs
on all products to 250%. The other agreement limits tariffs on all products to 2%. The first
agreement is complied with all of the time. The second agreement is complied with all of the
time except occasionally on a particular widget. Under an effectiveness-based conception of
constitutionalism the second agreement is the more desirable, despite the fact that compliance is
not as uniform as with the first.
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based on the international norms. This rights-based concept main-
tains that international trade rules are intended to or at least by impli-
cation do create private rights in the name of economic liberty and
that enforcement of such rights through the availability of private
remedies in domestic courts is a necessary element of such rights.4"
Of course, the rights-based conception of constitutionalism elaborated
above derives from the traditional American view of rights, or at least
legal or constitutional rights, that assumes enforceability of those
rights by the individual against the government.4'
Political science literature discussing theories of political morality
is useful in framing the overlap as well as the differences between
these two conceptions of constitutionalism. Ronald Dworkin has dis-
tinguished between a goal-based and rights-based theory of political
morality.42 Indeed, there is a classic debate in political science litera-
ture as to whether (individual) rights can be supported from a utilita-
rian perspective.43 Rights are often thought of as a trump held by an
individual to a (government) action that injures the individual but that
would increase general welfare." Others argue that the existence of
the trump itself is justifiable under a utilitarian perspective. First, all
individuals in the community may have their welfare increased know-
ing that a particular individual's rights have not been violated.45 This
justification will be termed the benevolence justification. Second, no-
tions of rule-utilitarianism may support protecting rights even though
in a particular instance the general welfare might be inhibited.46 In
other words, following the rule (protecting the right) in all instances
enhances general welfare because of the certainty provided and the
lack of transactions costs in constantly assessing the benefits of the
40 PETERSMANN, supra note 1, at 400-03.
41 See Louis HENKIN, CONSTIrONAuSM AND RIGHTS 9, 15 (Louis Henkin & Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990), Constitutionalism and Rights 9,15 (1990) ("The U.S. idea of rights implies
the availability of remedies to vindicate them.... The role of courts in maintaining constitutional
limitations was seen as the hallmark of U.S. constitutionalism and was credited with ... the
security of individual rights."); Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitu-
tion?, 10 Am. UJ. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1233,1235 (1995) ("Americans are taught to think that consti-
tutional rights depend on judicial enforceability almost by definition."). Minnow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 Yale L.J. 1860, 1866-67 (1987).
42 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING Riomrs SERiousLY 169-73 (1977).
43 See David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in TsmoPEES OF Rboffrs 110 (Jeremy Waldron ed.,
1984); T.M. Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and Fairness, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra, at 137.
44 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in TkrmoEs OF RiGrrs, supra note 43, at 153.
45 This line of argument is explored and rejected from a utilitarian perspective by Dworkin,
id. at 155.
46 This line of argument is explored and rejected from a utilitarian perspective by Lyons,
supra note 43, at 123-32.
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individual right versus the gains to the community of an action violat-
ing the right. However, critics have questioned whether these are
truly utilitarian justifications.4 7 These critics claim that a utilitarian
would always seek to weigh the net welfare gains of any particular
action.
A comparison of the effectiveness concept and rights-based con-
cept of constitutionalism can be viewed through the lens this classic
debate in political science literature provides. The effectiveness con-
cept is concerned with maximizing national and world welfare by con-
straining governments' ability to take protectionist actions. It is
analogous to the goals-based version of political morality. The rights-
based concept focuses on the ability of the individual to make claims
against his government for actions violating international rules which
implicitly form rights. However, international trade rules put a new
twist on the debate.
If one assumes that international trade rules are static with no
possibility for further development, then one would have little trouble
reconciling the two conceptions' recommendations regarding the time
at which to create private remedies in domestic courts. Allowing indi-
vidual claims in domestic courts would depoliticize the enforcement
process and likely maximize compliance with the international rules.
Again, public choice theory as well as impressions based on empirical
evidence indicate that violations of international trade rules are often
taken in response to consolidated protectionist forces rather than to
increase the general welfare. Therefore, upholding individual trading
rights implicit in international trade agreements through private reme-
dies is justifiable from a rights-based as well as effectiveness-based
conception of constitutionalism. In this context, a rights-based propo-
nent need not rely on the analogues to the utilitarian justifications for
a rights-based notion of political morality to convince an effective-
ness-based proponent of the desirability of immediate creation of pri-
vate remedies in domestic courts.
However, divergent results under the two conceptions of consti-
tutionalism in terms of the timing at which to introduce private reme-
dies in domestic courts are possible once the assumption of a static
system of rules is eliminated. International trade agreements are still
at the beginning stages of constraining sub-national government be-
havior ii certain non-tariff and new area matters.48 Thus, further de-
velopment or strengthening of the rules liberalizing trade is necessary
47 See Dworkin, supra note 44; Lyons, supra note 43.
48 Schaefer, supra note 4.
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to achieve maximum national and world welfare gains.49 If the possi-
bility of individual claims of right before national judicial bodies has a
chilling effect on the development of strengthened substantive rules,
then a proponent of the effectiveness conception of constitutionalism
would need to weigh this adverse effect against any compliance gains.
If a chilling effect will occur and outweighs any welfare gains through
enhanced compliance, then one may need to choose whether to grant
the implied rights in trade agreements a trumping status even though
welfare gains may be reduced. This will likely create a split between
rights-based proponents and effectiveness-based proponents. If the
chilling effect outweighs the compliance gains, then a rights-based
proponent will need to argue for immediate creation of private reme-
dies in domestic courts to the effectiveness-based proponent under a
benevolence or rule-utilitarian justification. As with the debate in
political science literature, such arguments will likely fail before a
staunch proponent of the effectiveness-based conception of
constitutionalism.
Of course, if the working definition of the rights-based concep-
tion of constitutionalism were broadened to include non-enforceable
rights that were still useful tools of persuasion,50 then the possible dif-
ferences between the two conceptions as to when to introduce the in-
stitution of private remedies in domestic courts might be eliminated
once again. A rights-based conception that moves away from the
traditional American view of legal rights would no longer insist on
enforceability through private remedies in domestic courts. Such a
rights-based conception might instead be willing to see the expansion
of implied rights through strengthened substantive rules even though
such rights would only be tools of persuasion within domestic political
systems. This paper, however, will define the rights-based conception
of constitutionalism from an American perspective.
Thus, the extent to which one highlights private remedies in do-
mestic courts as essential to the constitutional function of trade agree-
ments may depend on which conception of constitutionalism is chosen
(and, of course, how one defines each conception). Private remedies
in national courts are central to a rights-based conception of constitu-
tionalism, but are only a possible element of an effectiveness-based
conception of constitutionalism. The time at which an effectiveness-
based conception of constitutionalism demands the existence of pri-
49 Id.
50 Lyons, supra note 43, at 3-4. This second possible definition of rights is also discussed in
Minnow, supra note 41, at 1866-67; Schwartz, supra note 41, at 1239.
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vate remedies depends on how successful current enforcement mecha-
nisms are at achieving sub-federal government compliance and
whether the existence of private remedies would have a chilling effect
on the strengthening of substantive rules applicable to sub-federal
governments.
III. POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
As noted above, maximizing compliance with international trade
agreement rules is important for both the effectiveness-based and
rights-based conceptions of constitutionalism. In order to maximize
compliance, enforcement mechanisms are necessary.51 Professor
Jackson has described two types of diplomacy that could be utilized by
the international system: a power-oriented mechanism and a rule-ori-
ented mechanism.52 Indeed, one can view possible enforcement
mechanisms along a continuum with power-orientation at one end and
rule-orientation at the other end.5" The power-orientation model fo-
cuses on negotiation while the rule-orientation end of the spectrum
focuses on adjudication.54 Current enforcement mechanisms within
the WTO and NAFTA, the two major trade agreements to which the
United States and Canada are parties, involve third-party dispute set-
tlement mechanisms at the international level available only to gov-
ernments. Such enforcement mechanisms fall somewhere in the
middle of this continuum involving considerable elements of both ne-
gotiation and adjudication. Current enforcement mechanisms of the
VTO and NAFTA are analyzed below, followed by an examination of
possible future enforcement mechanisms.
A. Current Enforcement Mechanisms: NAFTA & WTO Dispute
Settlement Processes
The first step in any dispute under the NAFTA or WTO is consul-
tations between a complaining nation's central government and the
alleged offending nation's central government.55 If consultations fail
to resolve the dispute, then the complaining government may request
51 For the operative definition of enforcement mechanism see supra note 5.
52 JACKSON, supra note 38, at 85-88.
53 Id. at 85 ([I]n practice the observable international institutions and legal systems involve
some mixture of both.").
54 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987).
55 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 4,
33 I.L.M. 112, 116-17 (1993) [hereinafter DSU]; NAFTA art. 2006.
Private Remedies in Domestic Courts
17:609 (1996-97)
the establishment of an arbitral panel.56 Under the WTO, the com-
plaining government's request for a panel will be automatically
granted unless the Dispute Settlement Body, comprised of central
government representatives of the members of the WTO, decides by a
consensus to reject the request.57 Since the government requesting
the panel can simply refuse to join any potential negative consensus,
the right to a panel under the WTO is guaranteed. This is considered
an improvement from the old General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) system where an alleged offending nation could
"block" the establishment of a panel.58 Under NAFTA, the right to a
panel is also guaranteed.
Under both NAFTA and the WTO, dispute settlement panelists
serve in their individual capacity and may not take instructions from
any government.59 NAFTA panels consist of five members selected
from a roster maintained by the three countries.60 The disputing na-
tions first seek to agree on a chair of the panel.6' If they fail to agree
on a chair, one of the disputing nations chosen by lot selects as chair
an individual who is not one of its citizens. 62 The remaining four pan-
elist are chosen through "cross-selection." In other words, the com-
plaining nation must select two panelists who are citizens of the
alleged offending nation.63 Similarly, the alleged offending nation
selects two panelists who are citizens of the complaining nation. This
cross-selection process helps ensure the independence of the panelists.
Panels under the WTO will usually consist of three members as
under the old GATT system.64 Unless otherwise agreed, the panelists
can not be citizens of the parties involved in the dispute.65 The WTO
Secretariat proposes individuals to serve on the panels and parties are
only to object to such nominations for "compelling reasons. 66
56 DSU art. 4(7); NAFTA art. 2008. Under NAFTA, the NAFTA Commission, comprised of
federal trade ministers from the three countries, meets to attempt to resolve the dispute prior to
the establishment of an arbitral panel. NAFTA art. 2007(4).
57 DSU art. 6.
58 The DISC Case Between the United States and the European Community in the mid-
1970's was the worst example of delay in establishment and selection of a panel. It took the
parties nearly three years to agree on composition of the panel. See John H. Jackson, The Juris-
prudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747,762-63 (1978).
59 DSU art. 8(9); NAFTA art. 2009(2)(b).
60 NAFTA arts. 2009, 2011(1), 2011(3).
61 NAFTA art. 2011(1)(b).
62 Id.
63 Id. art. 2011(1)(c).
64 DSU art. 8(5).
65 Id. art. 8(3).
66 Id. art. 8(6).
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The duty of dispute settlement panels is to determine whether the
measure at issue is inconsistent with the agreement or otherwise caus-
ing nullification or impairment of benefits, and to make recommenda-
tions for resolution of the dispute.67 Both the NAFTA and WTO
processes allow parties to comment on interim reports of dispute set-
tlement panels.68 NAFTA panelists are entitled to furnish separate
opinions on matters not unanimously agreed.69 Additionally, under
both the NAFTA and the WTO, parties to the dispute may continue
to negotiate a solution to the dispute even after a panel has been com-
prised (and even after a panel has issued a report).70
WTO panel reports are automatically adopted unless the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report or the losing nation de-
cides to appeal the report.7' Again, the winning nation can simply
refuse to join any potential negative consensus and thus adoption of
the report is guaranteed. This "automaticity" provision deviates from
the practice under the old GAIT in which a losing nation could
"block" adoption of the report by the GAIT Council and thus pre-
vent an international legal obligation from being incurred.7 The
WTO has established an appeals process for panel reports.73 The abil-
ity to appeal panel reports is also seen as a significant improvement of
the old GAIT system. Three members of a standing seven member
appellate body will review only issues of legal interpretation.74 The
appellate body has the power to uphold, modify or reverse legal find-
ings in the original panel report. Appellate reports, like original
panel reports, are automatically adopted unless the DSB decides by a
consensus not to adopt the report.7 6
67 Id. arts. 7, 11; NAFTA art. 2016(2).
68 Id. art. 15; NAFTA art. 2016(4).
69 NAFTA art. 2017(1).
70 In other words, there is no legal point at which the parties to the dispute are prohibited
from settling the dispute. Of course, any negotiated solution that affects the interest of another
member can be protested by that other party using the dispute settlement system. The DSU
explicitly requires that solutions reached between parties be consistent with covered agreements
and demands notification to the DSB of such solutions. DSU art. 3(2)-(6).
71 Id. art. 16(4).
72 The possibility of blocking was seen as a weakness in the old GATT system by proponents
of a rule-oriented system. John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institu-
tions, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 11, 20-22 (1992); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCIURING THM
GAT!T SYSTEM (1991); Jackson, supra note 38, at 97.
73 DSU art. 17.
74 Id. art. 17(1) & (6).
75 Id art. 17(13).
76 Id art. 17(14).
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The WTO dispute settlement rules provide for continuous sur-
veillance of the implementation of panel reports and denotes a strong
preference for having the offending measure brought into conformity
with the relevant agreement rather than resorting to other remedies.77
The NAFTA also prefers a change in a non-conforming measure as a
solution "wherever possible. '78 Under both the WTO and NAFTA,
where a measure has not been removed and compensation or a solu-
tion can not be agreed upon by the nations, then concessions may be
suspended.79 Compensation is where the offending nation would
agree to lower tariffs on a product (or increase access to its market of
a service) of importance to the aggrieved nation. Suspension of con-
cessions is where the aggrieved nation raises tariffs on a product (or
limits market access for services) of importance to the offending party.
Under the WTO, suspension of concessions will be automatically ap-
proved by the DSB, in the absence of a negative consensus, upon the
request of the aggrieved nation if the inconsistent measure is not re-
moved within a reasonable time and compensation cannot be agreed
upon by the parties.80 Both agreements allow for "cross sectoral retal-
iation," e.g. suspension of concessions in the goods sector for a viola-
tion of an obligation concerning services,81 in certain circumstances.
The world trading system has moved towards a more rule-ori-
ented approach with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round multilat-
eral trade agreements and the establishment of a strengthened dispute
settlement system under the new World Trade Organization.' As
noted earlier, the ability of a single nation to block the process at vari-
ous stages under the old GATT dispute settlement system has been
eliminated. However, private parties cannot complain against foreign
government rule violations within the new dispute settlement system.
Instead, a private party must persuade its government to bring a com-
plaint against the foreign government violating the international rule.
Therefore, despite reforms and movement along the continuum, the
77 Id. art. 21.
78 NAFTA art. 2018(2).
79 Id. art. 22(2); NAFTA art. 2019.
80 DSU art. 22(6).
81 Id. art. 22(3)(c); NAFTA art. 2019(2)(b).
82 John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation or Cautious Small
Step Forward?, THm WORLD ECONOMY 11, 20 & 25 (1995) ("The new [dispute settlement agree-
ment] solves many, although not all, of the issues that have plagued the GATT dispute settle-
ment system."). Jackson notes, however, that some larger nations will be tempted to undermine
results of the new procedures and that if these nations succumb to such temptations the dispute
settlement procedure will lose credibility and "fail in its primary purpose of establishing and
maintaining a creditable 'rule-oriented' system.").
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dispute settlement system still allows for considerable control by gov-
ernments over the resolution of disputes and maintains a degree of
power-orientation in the enforcement of international norms. Simi-
larly, the North American Free Trade Agreement which may serve as
a model for the hemispheric-wide Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA) also does not allow for private party access to the
general dispute settlement mechanism.83 Private parties can bring
complaints against governments under NAFTA in only two limited
areas: review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations
and investment disputes. 84 This leads to an analysis of possible future
enforcement mechanisms, one that would allow for private party ac-
cess to the international dispute settlement process and one that
would provide for private remedies in domestic courts.
B. Possible Future Enforcement Mechanisms
1. Establish the Capacity of Private Parties to Bring Claims Against
Governments Under International Dispute Settlement
Processes
As noted above, the capacity of private parties to bring claims
against governments within international dispute settlement processes
exists even in the trade context, although in a very limited form. It
exists in a more general way in the context of international agree-
ments on other topics, including international human rights85 and in-
vestment.86 However, expanding the ability of private parties to make
claims against governments within the dispute settlement processes of
the WTO or even regional arrangements such as NAFTA faces strong
resistance; The United States made proposals at the end of the Uru-
guay Round to increase the access of private parties to the dispute
settlement process. These proposals did not go so far as to allow pri-
vate parties the ability to make claims but merely sought to make the
83 See generally NAFTA ch. 20.
84 Id. art. 1115-38, 1904.
85 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 59, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966).
86 International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID]. However, some ICSID claims may not involve a governmental violation of interna-
tional law but rather a contractual violation.
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process more transparent.87 However, even these proposals were ini-
tially rejected or watered-down. 8
One might question whether establishing such a capacity for indi-
viduals and corporations would advance the constitutional function of
trade agreements under either the effectiveness-based or rights-based
conception of constitutionalism. Such a system would certainly en-
hance the degree of rule-orientation. Governments would no longer
be able to filter (sometimes based on political considerations) which
claims are brought before international dispute settlement
processes.8 9 However, without further changes, the process after a
panel report would remain in government control and subject to some
degree of power-orientation. This is not to say that giving the capacity
to bring claims within international dispute settlement processes to
private parties would be meaningless in the post-panel report phase.
The existence of a panel report finding a government measure to be
inconsistent with international obligations would itself bring some
pressure on the offending government to change that measure and any
negotiated solution between governments would likely be influenced
by such a finding.90 Thus, a rights-based conception would appear to
support such an international dispute settlement mechanism allowing
the ability of private parties rather than governments to bring claims.
This would move the current WTO and NAFTA mechanisms further
towards the rule-orientation end of the spectrum. An effectiveness-
based conception of constitutionalism might also be attracted to the
creation of this capacity for private parties because it is likely to en-
hance compliance. However, an effectiveness-based conception
would need to weigh any such compliance gains against a possible
chilling effect that such a mechanism might have on the development
of strengthened substantive rules.
2. Private Remedies in Domestic Courts
Under the current WTO and NAFTA systems, enforcement is fo-
cused on the international level between governments. International
87 See, eg., U.S. to Urge Other Nations to Open Proceedings of New WTO to Public, 11 Irr'L
T ADE REP. (BNA) 815-16 (May 25, 1994).
88 There has been recent movement in increasing transparency, however. See WTO to Make
Most Documents Available to Public Immediately, INSIE U.S. TRADE, July 26,1996 at 17; United
States Welcomes WTO Decision to Improve Public Access to Proceedings, 13 INrr'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1208 (July 24, 1996).
89 Maintaining, initially, some sort of government filter may be one means of obtaining gov-
ernment consent to such a mechanism. JACKSON ET AL, supra note 14, at 208.
90 Id. at 209.
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law contains no general rule as to whether or how international obli-
gations must enter a nation's domestic legal system.91 This is based on
the principle that international law does not interfere with the internal
legal system of nations. Instead, the reception of international legal
rules is left to the domestic law of each nation. The basic categorical
division is between monist countries and dualist countries.' In monist
countries, international obligations are considered a part of the do-
mestic legal system with no act of transformation required.93 In other
words, international agreements have what is termed direct effect. In
dualist countries, international legal obligations do not enter the do-
mestic legal system unless an act of transformation occurs, either
through a statute incorporating the treaty or through separate imple-
menting legislation or regulation. In dualist countries, direct effect of
international agreements is not possible.94 Some countries are a mix-
ture of monism and dualism. In these countries, certain international
obligations will enter the domestic legal system directly while others
will require an act of transformation.
Of course, a particular treaty could specify a particular way in
which the treaty is to be given effect in domestic law.95 For instance, a
treaty might require that each signatory nation provide for private
causes of action to enforce the treaty within its domestic law. A broad
multilateral treaty could not require direct effect, however, because of
the existence of dualist nations that could not possibly meet such an
obligation. In any event, few treaties contain provisions specifying a
certain method by which the treaty must enter the domestic legal sys-
tem or even a manner in which it must be enforced domestically. In-
stead, international law concerns itself with the observance of treaty
obligations and the responsibility for the failure to perform
obligations.
One proposal in the Uruguay Round would have moved the
WTO enforcement mechanism much further towards the rule-orienta-
tion end of the spectrum by requiring nations to provide for private
causes of action in their domestic courts for government violations of
91 J.A. Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in
Community Law, 9 CoMMoN Micr. L. Rnv. 425, 426 (1972).
92 See THE EFFEcr OF TREaTIEs IN DOMESTIC LAw, supra note 3; John H. Jackson, Status of
Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 313-14 (1992); Ian
Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-34 (4th ed. 1990).
93 Jackson, supra note 92, at 314-15.
94 Id.
95 Jackson, supra note 3, at 154.
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WTO agreements. The proposal was rejected, however.96 The adop-
tion of such a proposal would diminish governments' monopoly con-
trol over the dispute settlement system and virtually eliminate the
possibility of negotiated solutions that stray from agreed rules. Thus,
it would appear that compliance with obligations would be maximized
as private actors with fewer political motivations and more direct eco-
nomic concerns would be granted the opportunity to bring claims and
domestic courts would ultimately enforce trade rules.
A rights-based conception of constitutionalism prefers an imme-
diate move to the far rule-oriented end of the continuum through the
creation of private remedies in domestic courts. This may be particu-
larly so with respect to sub-federal government behavior because pri-
vate remedies in domestic courts either through direct effect (if this is
possible within the nation) or by providing a private right of action
through federal implementing legislation is better able to serve a con-
stitutional function with respect to sub-federal governments than cen-
tral governments. This is a result of the hierarchy of sources of law
within federations. Constitutional norms are often thought to have
higher status than simple legislative acts.97 International agreements
with direct effect or federal legislation providing for a cause of action
based on an international agreement have superior status over sub-
federal laws and thus are more analogous to constitutional norms. 98
For instance, in the United States, federal law, including interna-
tional agreements with direct effect and federal statutes, prevail over
conflicting state statutes by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.99 While
federal law does not prevail over the Constitution, an international
agreement with direct effect or federal implementing legislation pro-
viding for private rights of action would maintain a higher status than
96 It should be noted that the renegotiated GATr Government Procurement Agreement
does require parties to establish expeditious bid challenge procedures for alleged breaches in
their domestic legal systems that are accessible by foreign bidders. See GATT Procurement
Agreement art. XX. However, the Government Procurement Agreement is not part of the
largely "single package" approach to the Uruguay Round and thus only 23 countries are parties
to the Agreement. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. II(2)(3) (gov-
ernment procurement agreement does not apply to all WTO members, only to those who have
accepted it).
97 See CONsTrrUtONAUSM 191 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (noting
that constitutional norms generally in the contemporary world have the force of higher or funda-
mental law).
98 It is a common feature of federations that valid federal law prevails over inconsistent sub-
federal laws. See, eg., U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2; British N. Amer. Act of 1867 § VI, pt. 91; Aus-
TRL_ CONSr. ch. V § 109.
99 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.; See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
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state law, thus making the vindication of rights in trade agreements
more certain in the long-term. A later-in-time act of a state would not
prevail over the implied rights secured via the agreement or the fed-
eral'statute. Conversely, as between an international agreement with
direct effect and a federal statute or as between two federal statutes
the later-in-time prevails in the U.S legal system if the two conflict.' °
Therefore, a federal statute violating foreign trading rights implicit in
a previously approved international agreement with direct effect or in
a previous federal law providing for private rights of action based on a
trade agreement would prevail under the later-in-time rule. Thus, pri-
vate remedies for violations of trading rights can be eviscerated by the
mere enactment of a subsequent federal law in conflict with such
rights.
For these reasons, private remedies in domestic courts may seem
particularly attractive in performing a constitutional function with re-
spect to sub-federal government behavior. Moreover, sub-national
governments in many nations, including federations such as the
United States, are subject to domestic constitutional or federal legisla-
tive constraints with respect to trade matters and private parties main-
tain remedies for violations of these constraints. It should be noted
that significant complications in providing private remedies for sub-
federal government violations may exist in some federal systems such
as Canada. Generally, however, actions by private parties are not an
entirely new means of restraining protectionist measures by sub-na-
tional governments.
Additional considerations enter the debate from the perspective
of an effectiveness-based conception of constitutionalism. On the one
hand, an effectiveness-based conception is also attracted towards the
rule-orientation end of the continuum, including the establishment of
private remedies in domestic courts, because of the likelihood of en-
hanced compliance. However, an effectiveness-based conception
must examine current enforcement mechanisms to gauge the likely
gains in compliance and also account for any chilling effect private
remedies in domestic courts might have on the development of
strengthened substantive rules.
100 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 115.
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IV. PRIvATE REMEDIES IN DoMEsTIc COURTS: Possmlurrms AND
PRACTICE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The United States could uphold an obligation in an international
agreement to provide for private remedies in domestic courts for vio-
lations of the agreement in two ways. First, U.S. courts (likely follow-
ing the intent expressed by the Congress and President) could hold
the international trade agreement to have direct effect (or be "self-
executing" under traditional U.S. terminology).10 1 Second, the United
States could create a private right of action in federal implementing
legislation.
In the absence of such an international obligation, the United
States has chosen not to make recent international trade agreements
"self-executing" or otherwise provide for private fights of action
against either the federal or state government. This is unsurprising
because nations are reluctant to provide for direct effect, or otherwise
provide private remedies in their domestic courts, unless other nations
also provide for reciprocal private remedies in their domestic courts.
(Indeed, lack of reciprocity has in the past been a basis for the Euro-
pean Court of Justice denying direct effect to GATT obligations
within the European Community). 02 Canada's constitutional system
does not allow for direct effect of international agreements and it has
chosen not to provide for private rights of action based on interna-
tional trade agreements through federal implementing legislation. In-
deed, Canada may face constitutional constraints in providing for a
private right of action to secure provincial compliance in certain areas.
A complete analysis of United States practice with respect to pri-
vate rights of action based on international trade agreements against
state governments follows. The Canadian possibilities and practices
are explored for comparative purposes.
101 Jackson, supra note 92, at 328; RESrATEMENT, supra note 3, § 111 cmt. h; Jackson, supra
note 3, at 150-56.
102 The approach of the European Court of Justice, however, has been somewhat inconsis-
tent. See Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, 17 N.W. J. IN'L Bus. 556 (1997).
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A. Relationship of the Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Panel Reports to State Laws Within the U.S. Domestic
Legal System
1. State Laws and International Agreements Generally
The United States is perhaps best categorized as "mixed" with
regard to the direct effect of international agreements. 0 3 Some inter-
national agreements (those that are "self-executing") enter the do-
mestic legal system without an act of incorporation while others
require such an act. Courts will look at the language of a treaty, the
intent of the parties to the treaty, and the intent of the Executive and
Congressional branches in deciding whether a treaty is "self-execut-
ing.",104 The Supremacy Clause provides that treaties (including Con-
gressional-Executive agreements, the method used for trade
agreements) and federal legislation prevail over inconsistent state law.
However, the issue of self-executing has relevance to whether an
agreement prevails over state law at least when private parties seek to
rely on such an agreement in U.S. courts. A non-self-executing agree-
ment is not part of domestic law and thus could not be relied on by a
private party. 10 5
The relationship between state laws and trade agreements has a
few additional wrinkles. First, the issue of self-execution does not
seem to be as important when it is the U.S. Executive Branch that
seeks to enforce a treaty against a state.10 6 The Executive Branch
could base its claim against a particular state action as an interference
with foreign commerce or foreign affairs. Additionally, the U.S. Exec-
utive Branch may apparently bring claims against the states for viola-
tion of an international agreement without regard to whether the
agreement is self-executing. The now famous Belmont'017 and Pink'08
cases appear to support this notion. In these two cases, the U.S.
103 Jackson, supra note 3, at 146.
104 Id.
105 As above, I do not mean here to merge the separate but related issues of self-executing
and invocability. See supra note 3. Rather, the proposition is that if an agreement is non-self-
executing, the issue of invocability is not raised.
106 An alternative way of thinking of this issue is that some agreements are self-executing and
invocable by the executive branch even if they might be held non-self-executing and non-invo-
cable if relied on by private parties. However, the cases cited below do not even raise these
issues while allowing the executive branch to make claims against states based on treaty viola-
tions. This seems to indicate that treaties of a mandatory nature (i.e., not involving norms of
aspiration) are implicitly self-executing and invocable by the executive branch for purpose of
correcting state violations.
107 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
108 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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Supreme Court upheld the validity of sole executive agreements and
their supremacy over state laws in actions brought by the U.S. Execu-
tive Branch without examining whether such agreements were self-
executing. The question arises as to whether the Executive Branch
has the ability to bring a claim against a state that violates an interna-
tional agreement which is not within the Executive's sole or inherent
powers. The Supreme Court has apparently recognized the ability of
the U.S. Attorney-General to enjoin state action based on a violation
of an international agreement itself in such instances even in the ab-
sence of Congressional approval and without regard to whether the
agreement was self-executing. 10 9
Second, private parties could try to use a non-self-executing inter-
national agreement in dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases" 0
and dormant foreign affairs doctrine cases."' The Restatement '3d
seems to hint at such a possibility stating, "[e]ven a non-self-executing
agreement of the United States, not effective as law until imple-
mented by legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to
be federal policy superseding state law or policy. 11 2 In such cases,
private parties would argue that the state action is interfering in for-
eign commerce or foreign affairs, relying in part on a violation of the
treaty. Such attempts have generally failed because the treaty relied
upon did not prohibit the state action in question. As mentioned
before, in those instances in which the federal government has consid-
ered a particular state action and chosen not to prohibit the action by
international agreement or federal legislation, the Supreme Court will
infer toleration of the state action and be unwilling to find the state
action interferes with federal uniformity in an area in which it is essen-
tial (i.e., the "one voice" standard)." 3 In matters affecting foreign
commerce, inferred toleration or acquiescence by the Congress cannot
109 See FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL WORL TRADE WrroTr BARRIERS: TiH WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION AND DisPuTE RESOLUTION 183 (1995); Louis HENKIN, FoREIGN AF-
FAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 167 (1972). See also Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S.
405, 425 (1925) ("This is not a controversy between equals. The United States is asserting its
sovereign power to regulate commerce .... It has standing in this suit not only to remove
obstruction to interstate and foreign commerce, the main ground, ... but also to carry out
treaty obligations to a foreign power .... The Attorney General by virtue of his office may
bring this proceeding and no statute is necessary to authorize the suit.").
110 On the dormant Commerce Clause see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
111 The so-called dormant foreign affairs doctrine was established by the Supreme Court in
Zchernig v Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
112 RESTATMEN-T, supra note 3, § 115 cmt. e.
113 See supra note 29.
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be overcome by Executive Branch pronouncements to the contrary."14
Additionally, courts may even find toleration evinced where Congress
has explicitly prohibited private causes of action based on such agree-
ments even though the state action at issue violates the treaty. This
would accord with the policy behind such a ban: private causes of ac-
tion themselves might be an interference with foreign commerce or
foreign affairs."15
2. Private Remedies Against Protectionist State Actions Based on
International Trade Agreements: A Chronology
An examination of the implementation of major U.S. trade agree-
ments shows a clear trend to eliminate the availability of private reme-
dies in U.S. courts against the states. There is also a trend to subject
the U.S. Executive Branch to greater procedural hurdles when bring-
ing an action against the states for violation of an international trade
rule. This section begins with an examination of the ability of private
parties to make claims against states based on the GATT 1947 in U.S.
courts. It proceeds to examine approaches undertaken with respect to
private remedies against state actions in the 1979 implementation of
the GATT' Tokyo Round Agreements, the 1987 implementation of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), the 1993
implementation of the NAFTA and the 1994 implementation of the
Uruguay Round WTO Agreements.
It is also important to note before this chronology that the
NAFTA and Uruguay Round implementing acts are essentially the
operative approaches today with respect to the availability of private
remedies against state actions. The Uruguay Round package of agree-
ments contains an amended GATT agreement, the so-called GATT
1994, that incorporates and supersedes the GAT? 1947, and also con-
tains revised non-tariff barrier agreements that supersede many of the
Tokyo Round agreements. The CUSFTA was suspended upon entry
into force of the NAFTA.
114 Barclays, 114 S.Ct. at 2285-86 ("Congress has focused its attention on this issue, but has
refrained from exercising its authority to prohibit state-mandated worldwide combined report-
ing. That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation practice, but
encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence that the practice interfered with the Na-
tion's ability to speak with one voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided
to yield the floor to others. . . . The Executive Branch actions-press releases, letters, and
amicus briefs-on which Colgate here relies are merely precatory. Executive Branch communi-
cations that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional Cali-
fornia's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.").
115 NAFrA Statement of Administrative Action, at 13.
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a. GATT 1947
The original GATT 1947 was proclaimed into U.S. law by the
President on delegated authority from the Congress.116 As a pre-ap-
proved Congressional-Executive agreement the Congress never con-
sidered the issue of whether the GATr 1947 should be self-executing
or whether to provide private remedies in U.S. courts for state viola-
tions of the agreement. Nonetheless, private parties have sued states
(on a few occasions) based On the GATT 1947 and courts have held
the GATT 1947 to apply to and bind the states. Indeed, several state
courts have struck down state laws based on the fact the laws violated
GATT 1947.117 Furthermore, it appears that no state court has ever
held that the GATT 1947 did not apply to and supersede state legisla-
tion."" Rather, courts rejecting challenges based on the GATT 1947
held that the specific acts challenged did not violate the GAIT.119
Most of these cases dealt with state government procurement restric-
tions and GATT Art. III, prohibiting discriminatory treatment of im-
ported products, contains an explicit exception regarding purchases
for governmental purposes. Professor Hudec claimed that, as of the
time of his study in the mid-1980's, there were examples of dicta in
state court opinions questioning the applicability and superiority of
GAIT obligations which made "the conclusion that GATT is superior
to state law a bit less secure than it was when Professor Jackson wrote
in 1967." 12° Professor Hudec relied in particular on dicta from a 1983
New Jersey State Tax Court Decision.' 2' However, as Professor
116 John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MicH. L. REv. 250, 291 (1967).
117 In Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E. 2d 300, 304 (IUI. 1986), the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld a lower court determination that a state statute excluding South African
Kugerands from an exemption on sales taxes of currency and gold coins as an unconstitutional
interference in foreign affairs. The lower court also found the measure to violate GATT but the
Supreme Court did not find it necessary to reach the argument.
118 But see Am. Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. Cty. of Erie, 297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1968) (holding
GATT inapplicable because of the government purchasing exception to Article III).
119 See, e-g., K.S.B Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774
(1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Delta Chemical v. Ocean County Utilities Author-
ity, 554 A.2d 1381, 1384 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1988). Some state courts seemed to be confused about
the coverage of the GATr, however. While not denying the status of GATT as federal law, one
state court indicated that GATr would not cover a state sales tax (which the court found to be
nondiscriminatory in any event). Ass'n of Alabama Prof. Numismatists, Inc. v. Eagerton, 455
So.2d 867, 870 (Ala. 1984). GAiT Art. III clearly covers internal taxes on goods including a
sales tax.
120 Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Status in Domestic Law, in Trm EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY
AND GATr 187, 221 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds, 1986).
121 Armstrong v. Taxation Division Director, 5 NJ. Tax 117 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983), affd 6 N.J.
Tax 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
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Hudec noted, the N.J. Tax Court ignored the view expressed in dicta
of a prior opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 22 Moreover, it
made statements showing a lack of comprehension of U.S. constitu-
tional law and international law such as "[t]here is some question as to
whether the GATT is binding on the states since the states are not
signatories to the agreement."'2 In any event, the N.J. Tax Court
went on to dispose of the GATT arguments on the merits. Moreover,
statements made by a New Jersey state court in a more recent case
support the initial view of the New Jersey Supreme Court that the
GATT 1947 did apply to and supersede inconsistent state
legislation. 124
These state courts did not address the question of how GATT
1947 was part of domestic law. Specifically, the courts did not state
whether GATT 1947 was domestic law as a result of the presidential
proclamation under delegated authority from Congress or whether
the GATT 1947 was "self-executing." However, the better view ap-
pears to be the former. 25
b. 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements Implementing Act
The 1979 implementing legislation of the GATT Tokyo Round
non-tariff barrier agreements or so-called codes only contained one
explicit provision with respect to state laws. 26 Again, however, it was
clear that none of the codes negotiated with respect to non-tariff bar-
rier measures were intended to be self-executing.127 No explicit provi-
sion was included in the implementing legislation with respect to the
state laws generally because very few of the Tokyo Round Codes re-
lated to or applied to state measures. The two with the most rele-
vance to the states were the Technical Standards Code and the
Subsidies Code. The Technical Standards Code was interpreted as
only requiring Parties to "use their best endeavors" or "make polite
requests" to local governments to comply with its obligations. 2s
122 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. 381 A.2d 774.
123 Armstrong, 5 NJ. Tax at 133.
124 Delta Chem., 554 A.2d at 1384.
125 See Jackson, supra note 116, at 280-92. But see 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147 (Cal. 1960).
126 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
127 See Jackson et al., supra note 14, at 169-71.
128 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the GA7T
Multilateral Trade System Possibilities and Problems of Making GATT Rules Effective in Domes-
tic Legal Systems, in TBE NEw GATT ROUteD OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEoOTIATIONS:
LEGAL & ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 96-97 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988);
Hudec, supra note 6, at 233; Louis, Implementing the Tokyo Round in the European Community,
in JACKSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 51.
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Thus, the U.S. implementing legislation of the code only gives the
"sense of Congress" that no State should engage in standards-related
activities that create unnecessary barriers to trade and directs the
President to take such reasonable measures as may be available to
him to promote observance of the code by states. 29 The Subsidies
Code did apply to the states,'130 however, it only had stringent obliga-
tions with respect to export subsidies. 13  No provision was made in
the U.S. implementing legislation specifically with respect to state ex-
port subsidies.
c. 1987 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementing Act
In the case of the CUSFTA, the implementing legislation of the
agreement declared that the provisions of the agreement prevail over
any conflicting state law. 32 The agreement was still not self-executing
with respect to state governments. However, the implementing legis-
lation incorporated the agreement into U.S. law to the extent state law
conflicts with it. The U.S. Attorney-General was given explicit power
by the implementing legislation to bring actions against states for
maintaining or applying laws inconsistent with the CUSFTA. 33 How-
ever, private persons were denied the right to challenge in U.S. courts
state laws that may be inconsistent with the CUSFTA.13 1
d. 1993 NAFTA Implementing Act
The 1993 NAFTA implementing legislation has no provision, like
that found in the CUSFTA, stating that the provisions of the agree-
129 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 403, Pub. L. No. 96-39,93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19
U.S.C. 2533 (1996)).
130 See 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI,
XVI, & XXIII of the GAT" [hereinafter Subsidies Code], Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.N.T.S. 513, 530
n.22 (1979) ("subsidy" shall be deemed to include subsidies granted by any government or any
public body within the territory of a signatory. However, it is recognized that for signatories
with different federal systems of government, there are different divisions of powers. Such signa-
tories accept nonetheless the international consequences that may arise under this Agreement as
a result of the granting of subsidies within their territories.").
131 Cf. Subsidies Code art. 11 (covering domestic subsidies) with Subsidies Code art. 9
(prohibiting export subsidies on non-primary products, i.e., products other than certain farm,
forest or fishing products). Some states do maintain export subsidy programs. There has never
been any determination of whether these programs violate the Code. For a discussion see Matt
Schaefer & Thomas Singer, supra note 2, at 51-52.
132 U.S.-Canada FTA Implementation Act of 1988 § 102(b), Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat.
1851, 1853 (1988) [hereinafter CUSFTA Implementation Act] (codified at 19 U.S.C. sss 2112
(1996)).
133 Id. § 102(b)(3).
134 Id. § 102(c).
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ment prevail over state law to the extent of any conflict. Such a provi-
sion was seen as unnecessary for federal government enforcement in
light of specific authorization for such a suit. It is possible that even
this explicit Congressional authorization of an Executive Branch
cause of action is unnecessary.135 However, even if Congressional au-
thorization is unnecessary as a legal matter, the explicit authorization
serves an important role in clarifying the Executive Branch power in
this regard. The NAFTA implementing act does follow the approach
of the CUSFTA implementing act in prohibiting private causes of ac-
tion. It states that:
"No State law, or the application thereof, may be declared invalid as to
any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or applica-
tion is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by
the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application
invalid.' 3 6
Thus, only the federal government can bring suit against a state
for maintaining a law inconsistent with NAFTA. Prior to bringing a
suit the Executive Branch would have to work-on a cooperative basis
with offending states, including direct consultations between the Presi-
dent and the respective state Governors.137 Should the U.S. Attor-
ney-General decide to bring suit against a state, a court would decide
the case on the basis of the NAFTA text in light of the negotiating and
legislative history of the agreement, including the Statement of Ad-
ministrative Action. 38 The Statement of Administrative Action con-
tains many clarifications of the intent of certain provisions of the
agreement regarding state laws and practices.
Such clarifications would assist the states in any future suit over
relevant NAFTA provisions. While not law, the Statement of Admin-
istrative Action contains interpretations of the Executive Branch and
is formally approved by Congress in the implementing law.139 There-
fore, the Statement of Administrative Action should be accorded
more weight than traditional sources of legislative history such as
committee reports. Moreover, the President, at least for purposes of
domestic law, apparently does not have the power to change an inter-
pretation of an agreement if the interpretation would conflict with the
135 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
136 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182
§ 102(b)(2), 107 Stat. 2057, 2062 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act] (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994)).
137 North American Free Trade Agreement Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong, 1st Sess. 450, 461 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1994)).
138 Id. at 13.
139 NAFTA Implemention Act § 101(a)(2).
Private Remedies in Domestic Courts
17:609 (1996-97)
Congress' understanding of the agreement at the time it was ap-
proved. 140 In essence, to change an interpretation of the agreement in
such a way would be an attempt by the President to make a new trade
agreement but the President has no constitutional authority to con-
clude a trade agreement without the approval of Congress. 14 1
Additionally, it is important to note that NAFTA dispute settle-
ment panel reports under the general dispute settlement mechanism
do not have any self-executing effect and do not bind federal or state
courts. Moreover, such reports in no way represent U.S. foreign pol-
icy since the United States can respond to such reports in several
ways.
14 2
The ban on private causes of action represents a determination by
the Congress and the Administration that private lawsuits are not an
appropriate means for ensuring state compliance with NAFTA or its
two supplemental agreements. Private suits, it was feared, would
themselves interfere with the conduct of foreign trade relations by the
Administration (in consultation with Congress) and appropriate solu-
tions to disputes under the NAFTA."43
e. 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Implementing Act
Private parties can no longer sue states in U.S. courts based on
the GATT 1947 as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. The
Uruguay Round agreements contain a revised GAIT 1994, which in-
corporates the GAiT 1947. The U.S. Uruguay Round implementing
legislation largely follows the approach of the NAFTA implementing
legislation and prohibits private causes of action.144 However, it adds
a few additional procedural clarifications regarding an Executive
Branch suit.
First, the implementing legislation states that, in a suit by the
United States against a state, dispute settlement panel reports "shall
not be considered as binding or otherwise accorded deference." 45
This generally clarifies what has been the case under previous trade
agreements and would be the case under the Uruguay Round agree-
ments even in the absence of the explicit legislative provision. Dis-
pute settlement panel reports are clearly not intended to be "self-
140 See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTTUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 134-45 (1990).
141 See iL (discussing parallel argument regarding treaties approved by two-thirds of the
Senate).
142 NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action at 13.
143 Ad.
144 See generally, Uruguay Round Implementation Act, § 102.
145 Id § 102(b)(2)(B)(i).
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executing" and thus cannot bind U.S. courts. The language "or other-
wise accorded deference" may have some impact although it appears
a court could still, at the very least, take judicial notice of a dispute
settlement panel report.146
Second, the United States maintains the burden of proving that a
state law is inconsistent with the trade agreement.147 The United
States would bear the burden of proof in such a case anyway. Essen-
tially, this provision attempts to deal with a concern that in the area of
foreign affairs and foreign commerce courts give too much deference
to views of the Executive Branch.148 . However, even in a future case
against the states, it seems that courts will continue to give "great
weight" to Executive Branch interpretations of provisions in the
agreement provided these do not conflict with interpretations con-
tained in the Statement of Administrative Action.
Third, other states are given the unconditional right to intervene
in such a suit as a party.149 The United States is entitled to amend its
complaint to include a claim or cross-claim against the law of the in-
tervening state.150
Fourth, any state law declared invalid in such a case is only
deemed invalid prospectively from the date all timely appeals, includ-
ing discretionary review, are exhausted. 51 The ban on retroactivity
was seen as important particularly in the area of direct taxation.
Otherwise, the states could have potentially large refund liability ac-
cruing as a case advanced through the courts.'52
The fifth procedural addition in the Uruguay Round implement-
ing legislation is a declaration that the Statement of Administrative
Action "shall be regarded as an authoritative expression by the
United States concerning the interpretation and application of the
Uruguay Round agreements" in any case concerning interpretation of
146 The impact of this language is minimized if the Executive Branch agrees with the interpre-
tation in the panel report. The Executive Branch's interpretations will be given "great weight"
by courts. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
147 Uruguay Round Implementing Act, § 102(b)(2)(B)(ii).
148 RE STATEMENT, supra note 3, § 112 cmt. c.
149 Uruguay Round Implementing Act, § 102(b)(2)(B)(iii).
150 Id.
151 Id. § 102(b)(2)(B)(iv).
152 It should be noted, however, that broad reservations were taken in the U.S. schedule to
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for state direct taxation measures, and
thus the chance a state taxation measure would be at issue in such a case is extremely remote.
Additionally, the GATS text itself contains a broad exemption for direct taxation measures. See
General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(d), 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
640
Private Remedies in Domestic Courts
17:609 (1996-97)
the agreement. 153 As the discussion of the NAFTA implementing act
above revealed, interpretations contained in its statement of adminis-
trative action should also be considered as determinative at least for
purposes of domestic law. The Uruguay Round explicitly clarified the
status of the Statement of Administrative Action because of lingering
concerns that a future Administration could change an interpretation
found in the Statement of Administrative Action for purposes of do-
mestic law to the detriment of state interests.
As noted above, clarifications within the Statement of Adminis-
trative Action can provide significant protection to states in this re-
gard. For instance, the Statement of Administrative Action which
accompanies the implementing legislation of the Uruguay Round adds
additional clarifications on General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) impact on state taxation measures. One fear of state officials
was that GATS would somehow affect unitary taxation measures or
apportionment formulas. However, the Statement of Administrative
Action clearly states that the GATS national treatment obligation will
not require "any change in unitary taxation measures or the appor-
tionment formulas applied in connection with such measures."
The sixth addition was an attempt to prevent parties from using
Uruguay Round agreements to prove an interference with foreign
commerce under the dormant Commerce Clause. This provision
states Congress' intent to occupy the field with respect to private
causes of action based on the Uruguay Round agreements. 154 Such an
intent could be inferred from the ban on private causes of action itself
and the policy behind such a ban declared in the statement of adminis-
trative action.
One criticism of the arrangements created by the NAFTA and
Uruguay Round implementing acts that lingers is that state laws have
a different status than federal laws. 155 Federal laws held inconsistent
with a trade agreement can only be overturned through an act of Con-
gress whereas state laws can ultimately be overturned through a suit
153 Uruguay Round Implementing Act, § 102(d).
154 ld., § 102(c)(2).
155 This criticism first arose at the international level after the GATT Beer II case where it
was held that only federal laws were eligible to be grandfathered under the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application (PPA). (The GAT was never entered into force but instead was applied
through the PPA.). See Protocol of Provisional Application to the GAiT, Oct. 30 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 308. The GATT 1994 in the package of Uruguay Round Agreements largely eliminates
grandfather rights maintained under the PPA and thus this particular aspect of the criticism is no
longer valid. See GATT 1994 art. 3(a), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316 ,103d Cong., 1st Sess.
1340 (1993) (providing the only remaining "grandfather right"). However, the criticism is now
maintained at the level of domestic law.
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by the U.S. Attorney-General. During the Uruguay Round imple-
menting process, some state officials criticized this disparate treatment
as placing state laws at a lower status. While the use of devices within
international agreements to limit the exposure of state laws and the
procedural protections described above largely eliminated such con-
cerns, one must also look at federal and state laws from the perspec-
tive of U.S. Executive negotiating credibility to see the policy behind
the arrangements. The Executive is given "fast-track" authority to
present Congress with a bill that achieves all the changes necessary to
make U.S. laws consistent with a trade agreement. 156 The bill is sub-
ject to a simple up or down vote with no possibility for amendments.
This gives the U.S. Executive negotiating credibility with respect to
federal laws. Unlike the federal government, the states are not re-
quired to make any up front changes to their laws.157 Instead, the
Executive (after consultations with the Congress and numerous other
hurdles are passed) is granted as a last resort the ability to sue a state
to force compliance with a trade agreement. This gives the U.S. Exec-
utive negotiating credibility with respect to state laws. More impor-
tantly, requiring pre-emption of state violations of international trade
agreements through specific pieces of legislation would move enforce-
ment away from the rule-orientation end of the spectrum and thus
further impede the constitutional functions of trade agreements.
3. Canada
Under Canadian law, treaties do not have direct effect in domes-
tic law. In other words, an act of transformation is required to incor-
porate international trade agreement rules into the domestic legal
system.' 58 Thus, Canada is considered a strictly "dualist" nation with
respect to treaties. No provision of the Constitution states the rule
that a treaty will not be directly applicable, rather the rule was derived
from the United Kingdom.
Additionally, the Canadian federal government may have consti-
tutional difficulties in providing for private remedies against the prov-
inces through federal implementing legislation. Under the long-
standing and famous Labor Conventions case, the federal government
does not have the power to implement treaty obligations within the
156 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 162-68.
157 This has been acceptable and consistent with U.S, international obligations because ex-
isting state legislation inconsistent with major obligations in NAFTA and the GATS has been
grandfathered. See Schaefer, supra note 4.
158 See Edward G. Lee, Canadian Practice in International Law, 1986 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L
L. 386, 401.
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domestic legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. With neither the
federal government nor the provinces anxious for a court case testing
the exact extent of Labor Conventions and the federal government's
trade and commerce power, the approach in trade agreement imple-
menting bills has been to reject the possibility of private causes of
action against the provinces based on trade agreements without the
consent of the federal Attorney-General. 159 The federal government
merely included a statement retaining the power to pass legislation
necessary to implement the CUSFTA and maintaining the ability to
issue regulations necessary to implement international obligations re-
garding the marketing and sale of beer and alcoholic beverages under
both CUSFTA and NAFTA implementing laws. These minimalist ap-
proaches were considered the least confrontational with respect to the
provinces' jurisdiction.160 Thus, with respect to certain matters consti-
tutional amendment or reinterpretation may be necessary before the
federal government can provide for private remedies against provin-
cial governments as a legal matter.
V. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL DisPuTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESSES AND POSSIBLE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AcrION: THE MODUS OPERANDI
AND How SUCCESSFUL IS IT IN
ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE?
Since private causes of action in domestic courts are not provided
for in either the United States or Canada, sub-federal compliance with
NAFTA and WTO obligations is left to the dispute settlement systems
under these agreements and to possible federal government action.
As a result, the modus operandi of correcting sub-national govern-
ment violations is a process containing elements of rule-orientation
and power-orientation at both the international and domestic levels.
It is generally recognized that the federal governments of the
United States and Canada are unlikely to attempt to sue their states
and provinces, respectively, unless the relevant state or provincial ac-
tion is first subject to an adverse international dispute settlement
panel finding. While U.S. federal government authority does not de-
pend on the existence of an adverse panel report, political considera-
tions almost certainly make an adverse panel report a precondition to
159 Steger, Canadian Implementation of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY RouND (John H. Jackson ed., 1996) (forthcoming).
160 See Anonymous, Issue of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FED-
ERATION 39, 45-46 (1987-88 ed.).
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a federal suit. Constitutional as well as political considerations will
caution the Canadian federal government against taking court action
in the absence of an adverse panel report and, depending on the sub-
ject matter, may prevent the federal government from taking court
action altogether. Thus, violations by states or provinces of interna-
tional trade rules is likely to arise in a legal context at the interna-
tional level first. The U.S. modus operandi for obtaining state
compliance in case of a violation by a state of an international trade
rule is analyzed below. The Canadian process is briefly analyzed for
comparative purposes. It should be noted that states and provinces
generally comply on a voluntary basis. This may be for a variety of
reasons: the substantive rules do not provide many constraints (or
only politically approved constraints), 161 a realization of the welfare
gains from compliance, and/or the existence of a culture of compli-
ance162 within sub-federal governments.
A. Securing U.S. State Compliance in Cases of Rule Violation
As noted before, dispute settlement panel reports under the
WTO or NAFTA do not have self-executing effect within the United
States. Instead, adopted WTO reports establish an international legal
obligation to remove the offending measure and NAFTA reports are
generally to be the basis for an agreement to resolve the relevant
dispute.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative in its testi-
mony before Congress has highlighted the fact that, under NAFTA or
the WTO, a nation cannot be forced to change its measures in re-
sponse to an adverse panel report, although the removal of the mea-
sure is clearly preferred. 63 Nonetheless, the political and/or
economic pressures placed on a state to remove a measure held incon-
sistent with the NAFTA or WTO by a dispute settlement panel may
be significant depending on the circumstances.
The U.S. Executive has not been granted compensation negotiat-
ing authority and is unlikely to be granted such authority. The U.S.
161 For instance, U.S. States only voluntarily joined the Government Procurement Code.
162 I borrow this term from Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values & Functions, in
1989-IV RECEUIL DEs CouRs (1989) (discussing the term with respect to nations rather than
sub-national governments).
163 The Role of Science in Adjudicating Trade Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement: Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the U.S.
House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1992) (statement of Charles E. Roh, Jr., As-
sistant U.S. Trade Representative); Letter from Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, to Congress, Apr. 29, 1994 (on file with author).
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Executive can make requests in specific instances for such authority.
However, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. Executive would ask for
such authority if a state measure is held inconsistent with the NAFTA
or a Uruguay Round agreement because any compensation is likely to
affect economic interests in other states besides the one that has re-
fused to change its measure.
If no compensation is granted, the aggrieved country can suspend
concessions.164 However, the political and economic power of the
United States within the NAFTA and WTO should not be underesti-
mated. Most nations are not anxious to retaliate against the United
States. The procedural and legal protections granted to the states in
the respective implementing laws and statement of administrative ac-
tions (as well as political considerations) provide a substantial assur-
ance that U.S. power on the international scene will be exercised on
the behalf of states. Additionally, retaliation is not an effective option
for most smaller nations.165 Lastly, as the United States itself has
found in the past, the interdependence of the international economy
often makes it tough to craft sanctions that only impact a foreign
country without harming businesses (such as industrial imported input
users) and workers in the domestic economy. 166
However, if a large trading partner proceeds with retaliation, it is
likely to target suspended concessions in sectors of importance to the
state that refuses to change its NAFTA-inconsistent or WTO-inconsis-
tent measures. This will create economic pressures on the state to
change its law. Moreover, even if the aggrieved country is unable to
target suspended concessions solely at a particular state or states (i.e.,
spillover effects are created that adversely impact other states), such a
scenario would put pressure on the U.S. government to ensure that
the state whose measures were held to be inconsistent with NAFTA or
WTO commitments changes its laws.
The exact scenario will depend on a number of factors including
the number of states having laws found in violation of the agreement,
the apparent legitimacy of the law, and the impact on trade of the
state measures. For example, in the 1992 GATT Beer II case over 40
states' laws were found in violation of the GATT 1947 by a GATT
panel. 67 Only a few states have changed their laws so as to conform
164 DSU art. 22(2); NAFTA art. 2019.
165 Davey, supra note 54, at 102.
166 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organiza-
tion: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 Ir'L LAWYER 1095, 1103 (1994).
167 United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, 39 Supp.
BISD 206 (GATT Pan. 1993).
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with the panel report and the federal government has not brought suit
against the remaining states.
In light of the (lack of) implementation of the Beer II panel re-
port, one might conclude that the current enforcement mechanism
consisting of the international dispute settlement process followed by
executive branch persuasion with the possibility of a suit needs im-
provement. However, several factors involved in the case suggest
some caution is needed in drawing such a conclusion. First, Canada
has not retaliated and the state measures are thought to have little
impact on trade, so any retaliation would be quite small. 68 The claim
by Canada in the Beer II case was thought to be a retaliatory claim
brought primarily for political rather than economic reasons. The
United States previously brought a successful case within the GATT
against Canadian provincial measures affecting the marketing and dis-
tribution of beer (the so-called GAT Beer I case).169
Second, the GATr Beer II panel based part of its decision on an
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution of the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and the 21st Amendment regarding an issue never
specifically and definitively addressed before by the U.S. Supreme
Court.170 Thus, ultimate federal authority to successfully sue the
states in this area is not absolutely assured.
Third, the states were largely dissatisfied with their participation
in the Beer II case. However, a more elaborate form of cooperation
provided for in the NAFTA and Uruguay Round implementing acts
may increase the likelihood of implementation by the states of any
future adverse panel reports. The NAFTA implementing law requires
that states be "involved (including involvement through the inclusion
of appropriate representatives of the states) to the greatest extent
practicable at each stage of the development of United States posi-
tions regarding matters [that directly relate to, or will potentially have
a direct impact on, the states] that will be addressed ... through
168 See Roh, supra note 163, at 84 (in response to question).
169 Canada Import, Distribution, & Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing
Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, 39 Supp. BISD 206 (GATr Pan. 1993).
170 See U.S. Statement on GAIT Beer Panel, reprinted in Special Report, INSEDE U.S. TRADE,
June 26, 1992 at S-2 ("the panel incorrectly extrapolates from one line of U.S. Supreme Court
cases concerning state tax issues to conclude that state issues under consideration in this portion
of the panel report-which concern the distribution of alcoholic beverages-would be governed
by the Commerce Cladse of the U.S. Constitution, despite explicit state authority under the 21st
Amendment of the Constitution, and hence, would not be eligible for coverage under the [Proto-
col of Provisional Application]. These, indeed, involve weighty and complex issues of U.S. do-
mestic Constitutional law.").
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dispute settlement processes provided for under the agreement.'
17 1
The Uruguay Round implementing law provides for similar inclusion
of the states but adds specific time deadlines for notification and in-
cludes certain language from the NAFTA Statement of Administra-
tive Action in the implementing law.172 The Uruguay Round also
changes the language "involve states ... to the greatest extent practi-
cable" to "make every effort to ensure that the state concerned is
involved."'1
73
State involvement in the process will increase state awareness and
therefore may expedite state adjustment to panel decisions ruling
against state measures. In this respect, state involvement may also
have benefits from the perspective of the federal government and the
international trading system. States are less likely to view any results
of a dispute settlement proceeding as originating from a "federal sell-
out"'174 or "faceless bureaucrats."
The states will not make separate representations before dispute
settlement panels. Therefore, the United States will continue to
"speak with one voice" before international panels. As a general rule,
it will be federal actors that do the actual speaking before dispute
settlement tribunals.' 75 States are allowed to appoint a representative
or representatives that will participate in internal discussions of the
U.S. dispute settlement delegation to ensure that state expertise and a
171 NAFTA Implementation Act § 102(b)(1)(B)(v).
172 Uruguay Round Implementation Act § 102(b)(1)(C). The time deadlines in the Uruguay
Round implementing act would have to be complied with even in a NAFTA dispute because
states have the right to be involved at each stage of the development of U.S. positions. In fact,
by insisting on the inclusion of notification and consultation time deadlines in the implementing
law that nearly correspond with the end of deadlines for various stages of the dispute settlement
process, certain state representatives may have (accidentally) given the federal government
more flexibility than the NAFTA implementing law approach.
173 Id. § 102(b)(1)(C)(iii).
174 See, e.g., Penelope Lemov, Can States Live Happily Ever NAFTA?, GOVERNING 20, 21
(Dec. 1992).
175 Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No.
103-316 vol. 656, 673 (1994) [hereinafter URAA Statement of Administrative Action]; NAFFA
Statement of Administrative Action, at 12. It should be noted that States potentially have stand-
ing under NAFTA Chapter 19 (establishing review by international panels of countervailing duty
and antidumping duty determinations of national authorities) for state subsidy programs. See
NAFTA art. 1904(7) ("[O]ther persons, who pursuant to the law of the importing Party, other-
wise would have the right to appear and be represented in a domestic judicial review proceeding
concerning the determination of the competent investigating authority, shall have the right to
appear and be represented by counsel before the panel."). Countervailing duty cases do not
involve a claim that the subsidy violates international law but rather that the subsidy is causing
injury to a domestic industry in the importing country. Since Canada and Mexico rarely use
countervailing duties it is unlikely that States will become involved in cases under this Chapter.
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state voice is incorporated into the U.S. defense.176 This state repre-
sentative would also have the ability to attend dispute settlement
panel hearings on the issue.177 The representative will be able to pro-
vide on the spot advice and information to the federal representatives
arguing the case. Additionally, the state representative will make part
of the actual presentation where it is determined to be appropriate. 71
The federal government, because of its constitutional responsibility
for foreign affairs, had some concerns in granting the state representa-
tive a guaranteed right to make a presentation to a panel. Indeed, the
states themselves were concerned about granting an individual state a
guaranteed right to make presentations before a dispute settlement
panel. A state representative unfamiliar with trade obligations and
proceedings could damage the case to the detriment of the states' in-
terests as a whole. In any event, the doomsday scenario of the federal
government "selling a state down the river" will be prevented by the
states' participation throughout the dispute settlement process and by
their presence at the panel hearings. Since a federal government suit
would be politically difficult in some circumstances, it is important to
increase the likelihood of voluntary change by states of any measure
found to violate international trade obligations through state partici-
pation in the dispute settlement process.
B. Securing Canadian Provincial Compliance in Cases of Rule
Violation
The Canadian federal government faces constitutional difficulties
in mandating provincial compliance in certain areas. Thus a federal
government suit in Canada might not be a legal option, let alone a
politically feasible option, in certain instances. However, the threat of
trade retaliation, particularly by the United States, is a greater con-
cern for Canada due to the size of its economy and its reliance on the
U.S. market. 79 Indeed, after the GATr "Beer I" case in which Cana-
dian provincial laws concerning the marketing of alcoholic beverages
were held inconsistent with GATT obligations, the United States im-
posed a tariff of 50% on beer brewed and bottled in Ontario because
176 See Schaefer & Singer, supra note 4, at 33.
177 See URAA Statement of Administrative Action, at 17.
178 Id
179 Fact Sheets: Canada, Report of the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. State Department 165
(1995) ("Canada sent 84% of its 1994 exports to the United States.").
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that province refused to change its practices sufficiently. 80 Ontario
subsequently changed its practices sufficiently to have the retaliatory
tariff removed. However, provincial practices regarding the market-
ing and distribution of alcoholic beverages were complained about as
early as the late 1980's by the European Community in the so-called
GATT Wine Case.' 8 '
With respect to disputes under the WTO and NAFTA the prov-
inces have no guaranteed right to participate. Despite provincial de-
mands, 182 neither the Canadian implementing legislation for these
trade agreements nor an intergovernmental agreement exists elabo-
rating a cooperative procedure with respect to trade disputes. 3
Nonetheless, as a practical matter provinces have been involved in the
preparation of cases and have even attended panel proceedings. This
lack of formal cooperative procedures contrasts with the intergovern-
mental agreement establishing federal-provincial cooperation with re-
spect to disputes under NAFTA's side environmental and labor
agreements. The federal government more carefully guards control of
trade disputes due to the federal government's trade and commerce
power (in spite of uncertainties over its extent). With respect to labor
matters and environmental matters, near exclusive and partial provin-
cial jurisdiction, respectively, is well established and recognized.
VI. WOULD A PRIVATE PARTY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM IN
DOMESTIC COURTS HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF STRENGTHENED
SUBSTANTIVE RULES?
While obligations within international trade agreements generally
apply to sub-federal governments, many techniques are used to limit
constraints on discriminatory or protectionist behavior. One tech-
nique is to "grandfather" or reserve existing state and provincial
measures inconsistent with services and investment obligations within
NAFTA and obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in
180 See U.S., Canada Reach Agreement on Access for U.S. Beer Sold in the Ontario Market, 10
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 32, 1319 (Aug. 11, 1993) (noting the removal of the duty on Aug.
5, 1993).
181 Canada Import, Distribution & Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agen-
cies, Mar. 22, 1988, 35 Supp. BISD 37 (GATT Pan. 1988).
182 See, eg., Manitoba's Position on the NAFTA, position paper of the Manitoba Provincial
Government 14 (Dec. 1992) (on file with author).
183 See World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act ch. 47, 1994 S.C. 1 (Can.);
An Act to Implement the North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 44,1993 S.C. 1921 (Can.).
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Services (GATS) within the WTO. 184 Another technique is to allow
states and provinces to voluntarily choose whether to become bound
to an agreement and tailor the extent to which they will be bound.
This technique was employed for state and provincial involvement in
the GATT Government Procurement Code renegotiated during the
time of the Uruguay Round.185 A third technique is to fully apply the
rules to sub-federal governments but negotiate rules that do not suffi-
ciently constrain protectionist behavior. For example, some believe
the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement will have little impact on
state subsidy wars attracting out-of-state or foreign investors. Thus,
strengthening the application of rules or the rules themselves is neces-
sary to constrain protectionist behavior of sub-federal governments
and maximize welfare gains from liberalization. 186 The question arises
as to whether the existence of private causes of action to enforce the
rules would have a chilling effect on the strengthening and develop-
ment of the rules?
States and provinces have fought vehemently against private
rights of action based on international trade rules. Private party rem-
edies with respect to sub-federal government behavior is politically
difficult in the United States. Questions of the relationship of the
WTO Uruguay Round agreements to state laws created one of the
greatest controversies during the development of the U.S. implement-
ing legislation.187 U.S. states generally are not willing to be subject to
private causes of action if federal laws cannot be challenged in such a
fashion. A letter from Governors Thompson and Richards to USTR
Ambassador Kantor during the Uruguay Round implementing legisla-
tion notes that such a situation would be an "intolerable inequality."
Granting private causes of action raise political as well as possible
constitutional difficulties (depending on the area) in Canada. Indeed,
such an approach might lead to an immediate constitutional challenge
over the respective jurisdictions of the federal and provincial
governments.
184 NAFTA arts. 1108(1)(a)(ii), 1206(1)(a)(ii), 1409(1)(a)(ii); GATS, 33 I.L.M. at 60. See also
Schaefer, supra note 4; Schaefer & Singer, supra note 4, at 54-55.
185 See Schaefer, supra note 4; Schaefer & Singer, supra note 4, at 56-57.
186 See Schaefer, supra note 4.
187 State Attorneys General Reach Agreement with USTR on GATT Concerns, 11 INTr'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1201 (Aug. 3, 1994); State Groups, Lawmakers Oppose Pre-emp-
tion of State Law Under GATT, 11 Ir'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 1136 (July 20, 1994);
State Officials to Ask Clinton for Trade Consultation Summit, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.
26, at 1028 (June 29, 1994).
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Thus, it is likely that the political hurdles that federal government
negotiators must overcome in strengthening substantive constraints on
sub-federal governments will only be raised if private remedies in do-
mestic courts are utilized as an enforcement mechanism. In light of
the political sensitivity (and possible constitutional constraints in Can-
ada) of creating such an enforcement mechanism, a proponent of the
effectiveness-conception of the constitutional function trade agree-
ments are to perform might well conclude that political capital might
be better spent strengthening the applicability of the substantive rules
to sub-federal governments. The current enforcement mechanism
that relies in part on negotiation at the international level and be-
tween sub-federal governments and the federal government at the do-
mestic level may enhance the likelihood that sub-federal governments
will give the necessary political consent to be bound to strengthened
substantive rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
Constitutions of federal nations lack comprehensive or sufficient
constraints on sub-federal government discretion exercised for protec-
tionist purposes. While the U.S. Constitution's dormant Commerce
Clause, along with other constitutional provisions, provides many lim-
itations on state protectionist behavior, large "gaps" in these con-
straints remain. The Canadian constitution provides even fewer limits
on provincial discretion exercised for protectionist purposes. Interna-
tional trade agreements, however, can perform constitutional func-
tions by limiting sub-federal government discretion exercised for
protectionist purposes. Indeed, it is essential in non-tariff barrier and
new areas of trade negotiations to constrain sub-federal governments
in order to increase world welfare. International trade agreements are
only at the beginning stages of developing these constraints.
The question arises as to whether the creation of private remedies
in domestic courts for sub-federal violations of international trade
rules is essential for international trade agreements to perform a con-
stitutional function. The answer to this question likely depends on the
operative conception of constitutionalism. The immediate creation of
such remedies is recommended by an American rights-based notion of
constitutionalism. Indeed, the attraction for such remedies is greater
with respect to sub-federal government violations than for federal
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Another conception of constitutionalism frequently discussed in
international trade circles focuses on effectiveness. An effectiveness
conception is ultimately attracted to private remedies in domestic
courts because it is likely to maximize compliance with international
trade rules. However, an effectiveness conception is also concerned
with the chilling effect such remedies might have on the development
of stronger substantive international trade rules applicable to sub-fed-
eral governments. If a proponent of the effectiveness conception
views the sub-federal government compliance record and current
mechanisms to correct sub-federal violations as relatively successful,
then the proponent will likely recommend delaying the introduction
of private remedies in domestic courts until strengthened substantive
rules applicable to sub-federal governments have been negotiated.
